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All usWe study unanimous decision making under incomplete information.
We argue that unanimous decision rules are not all equivalent. We show
that majority rules with veto power are (i) Pareto superior to commonly
used unanimous rules and (ii) ex ante efficient in a broad class of situ-
ations.I. IntroductionIn many sensitive situations, group decisions are required to be unani-
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Allwithout granting some sort of veto power to theirmembers. In such cases,
the constraint stems from sovereignty and enforceability issues (Zamora
1980; Maggi and Morelli 2006; Posner and Sykes 2014). Other examples
include partnerships and other unlimited liability companies (Romme
2004) or criminal trials by jury in the United States, where a unanimous
verdict is required by the Constitution.
Unanimous decision making can be seen as a means of ensuring that a
reform will be adopted only if it constitutes a Pareto improvement over
the status quo (Wicksell [1896] 1967; Buchanan and Tullock 1962). How-
ever, when information is incomplete, whether or not a reform is adopted
also depends on how information is aggregated (Holmstrom and Myer-
son 1983). The literature focuses on the so-called unanimity rule (hence-
forthUnanimity), which is commonly used inpractice: agents either consent
or dissent, and the reform is adopted only if everyone consents. Unfortu-
nately, this rule features poor information aggregation properties (Austen-
Smith and Banks 1996; Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998).
We argue that unanimous decision rules are not all equivalent. We
show that k-Veto rules are (i) Pareto superior to Unanimity and (ii) ex ante
efficient in a broad class of situations. Under these rules, agents have
three options—consent, dissent, or veto—and the reform is adopted if
and only if (i) at least k agents consent and (ii) there is no veto. We refer
to this rule as Veto when the quorum k corresponds to that of a simplema-
jority.
Let us sketch the argument that underpins our main results using a
simple example. There are three agents who have to vote on whether
to adopt a given reform or keep the status quo. The agents have either
private or common value, and this is private information. Private-value
agents always prefer the status quo. Common-value agents’ prior is that
the reform can be good or bad with equal probabilities, and they equally
dislike amistake in either direction. Before the vote, each agent receives a
private binary signal regarding the merits of the reform. With probability
two-thirds, the signal is correct: it is positive if the reform is good and neg-
ative if the reform is bad. As a result, the right decision for common-value
agents is to adopt the reform if and only if there are at least two positive
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majority rules with veto power 109Under any unanimous rule, it is a weakly dominant strategy for private-
value agents to veto the reform. Therefore, in their presence, the status
quo remains, irrespective of common-value agents’ behavior. This has
two implications. First, common-value agents behave as if there were no
private-value agents. Second, unanimous rules’ performances can differ
only when all agents have common value. Thus, information aggregation
is the relevant dimension for welfare comparisons between rules.
Under Unanimity, common-value agents with a bad signal are reluc-
tant to veto the reform because they are pivotal only if the two other
agents consent (see Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998). In equilibrium,
when there are no private-value agents, common-value agents make the
right decision about 88 percent of the time.
Under Veto, however, it is possible to reveal a negative signal without pin-
ning down the outcome. This is what happens in an equilibrium: common-
value agents with positive signals consent, and those with negative signals
dissent. When there are no private-value agents, common-value agents al-
ways make the right decision.
Therefore, Veto Pareto dominates Unanimity in the sense of Holm-
strom and Myerson (1983)—both ex ante and interim. That is, whatever
their type and signals, all agents (weakly) prefer to use Veto over Unanim-
ity.1
When common-value agents have identical preferences (i.e., homoge-
neous thresholds of reasonable doubt), this result analytically extends to
any precision of (possibly biased) signals and any group size. But such a
stylized structure of preference is not essential. Indeed, Veto interim Pa-
reto dominates Unanimity in cases in which common-value agents may
disagree ex post (i.e., they have heterogeneous thresholds of reasonable
doubt).
In our example above, Veto is ex post efficient. Provided that common-
value agents have homogeneous thresholds, this property generalizes as
follows: in all cases, there exists a k-Veto rule that enables common-value
agents to alwaysmake the right decision.When theymay disagree ex post,
the concept of “right decision” is ambiguous. Ex ante efficiency is then
the appropriate benchmark (Holmstrom and Myerson 1983). Relying on
a series of numerical examples and asymptotic results, we show that Veto
is ex ante efficient in a broad set of situations.
To delimit the applicability of our analysis, it is useful to think in terms
of social choice axioms (May 1952). When decisions are required to be
unanimous, there is an inevitable tension between neutrality (alternatives1 When there are only common-value agents, k -Veto also Pareto dominates the corre-
sponding k-majority rule, strictly when negative signals are sufficiently precise. The reason
is that k-Veto aggregates information as well as the best among the corresponding k-majority
rule and Unanimity. See the discussion in Sec. V.B.
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Allare treated equally) and completeness (a decision is made in all cases). We
study situations in which a unanimous decision is required to change a
well-defined status quo; thus, we give precedence to completeness over
neutrality. As a result, our analysis is not relevant to cases such as elec-
tions, where neutrality is considered essential (Dasgupta and Maskin
2008).
In real-world situations, the key elements that make our analysis rele-
vant are (i) a common-value dimension, (ii) a unanimity requirement,
and (iii) limits to timely and truthful prevote communication. In Sec-
tion VI, we argue that international organizations are a case in point.
We discuss the case of the United Nations Security Council, which illus-
trates well the reasons for the use of k-Veto rules in the real world and
why they have replaced Unanimity in some cases.
From a normative point of view, our results suggest that a number of
voting bodies that use Unanimity should consider using a k-Veto rule in-
stead. Examples include international organizations such as the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Council of the European Union in the
case of most sensitive topics (a k-Veto rule is already in use for matters
of common foreign and security policy), and the Southern CommonMar-
ket (Mercosur). Furthermore, their Pareto dominance, and their relative
simplicity, hint that such an institutional reformmay not encounter insur-
mountable resistance.
Finally, there is a vast literature that views trials by jury as an informa-
tion aggregation problem in which the voting system plays a crucial role.
Our analysis applies to such trials if, following this literature, we treat a
hung jury as an absence of conviction. One of the main debates focuses
on whether to useUnanimity or some formofmajority rule. Because Veto
combines the strengths of both Unanimity and majority rule, our results
may bring the two sides of the debate closer together.
Related literature.—A key idea of this paper is that, compared to Una-
nimity, Veto enriches the strategic environment so that veto power can
be granted without sacrificing information aggregation. This contrasts
with an earlier literature that suggests that these two dimensions are in
conflict. Specifically, the information aggregation literature shows that
the implementation of simple voting rules designed to protect minority
rightsmay lead to poor information aggregation and, somewhat paradox-
ically, may accomplish neither of the two goals (Feddersen and Pesen-
dorfer 1998).
Later studies have, however, identified cases in which these goals are
not incompatible. First, Coughlan (2000) shows that Unanimity aggre-
gates information well in two variations of Feddersen and Pesendorfer’s
model. In the first, the unanimity requirement is two-sided, but costless
mistrials are allowed. Full information aggregation is feasible, but it may
require agents to vote again and again on the same reform proposal until
it is accepted or rejected unanimously. In the second, he considers pre-This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on September 04, 2018 07:40:19 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
majority rules with veto power 111vote communication. Full information aggregation requires that agents
have very similar preferences. In a related paper, Austen-Smith and Fed-
dersen (2006) show that, in setups in which preferences are uncertain,
truthful revelation of private information is particularly problematic when
agents have veto power. Second,Maug and Yilmaz (2002) show that, when
preferences are common knowledge, requiring a majority within all (ad-
equately designed) subgroups of an electorate can achieve information
aggregation while protecting minority rights.
Broadly speaking, our paper relates to three strands of the literature.
First, it relates to the literature analyzing supermajority rules and/or veto
power (e.g., Chen and Ordeshook 1998; Guttman 1998; Groseclose and
McCarty 2001; Sobel andHolcombe 2001; Tsebelis 2002; Aghion and Bol-
ton 2003;McGann 2004; Dougherty and Edward 2005;Maggi andMorelli
2006; Dziuda andLoeper 2016;Nunnari 2016). Second, it is connected to
the literature that studies information aggregation in two-alternative de-
cisions with strategic voters (see, e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks 1996; Fed-
dersen andPesendorfer 1996, 1997, 1998;McLennan 1998;Myerson 1998;
Chwe 1999; Coughlan 2000; Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey 2000;
Maug and Yilmaz 2002; Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2006; Martinelli
2006; Gerardi and Yariv 2007; Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey 2008, 2010;
Van Weelden 2008; Bond and Eraslan 2009; Goeree and Yariv 2011; Mand-
ler 2012; Bhattacharya 2013; McMurray 2013). Third, it is related to the lit-
erature studying properties of voting systems (see, e.g., Myerson andWeber
1993;Myerson 2000, 2002; Piketty 2000;Dewan andMyatt 2007;Myatt 2007,
2015; Ahn andOliveros 2012, 2014; Bouton and Castanheira 2012; Bouton
2013; Ekmekci and Lauermann 2015; Herrera, McMurray, and Llorente-
Saguer 2015; Bouton, Castanheira, and Llorente-Saguer 2016).II. The ModelA group of n ≥ 3 agents (with n odd) must choose between two alterna-
tives, the status quo Q and the reform R.2
Information structure.—There are two states of nature, q ∈ f qQ , qRg,
which materialize with equal probability. The actual state of nature is not
observable, but each agent privately observes an imperfectly informative
signal. Conditional on the state of nature, the signals are independently
drawn. There are two possible signals: sQ and sR. The probability of an agent
observing signal sQ is higher in state qQ than in state qR, and the converse is
true for sR:
PrðsR jqRÞ > PrðsR jqQ Þ > 0  and   PrðsQ jqQ Þ > PrðsQ jqRÞ > 0:
This assumption is made without loss of generality. In particular, it allows
for cases in which observing one signal is more likely than the other in2 That n is odd only simplifies the exposition.
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Allboth states, for example, PrðsQ jqRÞ > PrðsR jqRÞ. In a slight abuse of nota-
tion, we denote by si the signal received by agent i.
Preferences.—Agents may have common value or private value. Common-
value agents all prefer decision Q in state qQ and decision R in state qR.
However, common-value agents may differ in their disutility from wrong
decisions. We capture this with the following von Neumann–Morgenstern
utility function:This 
 use subject to UState of the World
qR qQ
Group R 0 2ci
Decision Q 2(1 2 ci) 0content downloaded
niversity of Chicag from 128.04
o Press Term0.090.253 on September 
s and Conditions (http://wwhere ci ∈ ð0, 1Þ. In this representation, ci and (1 2 ci) are the respective
weight that common-value agent i attaches to errors of type I (adopting a
bad reform) and type II (not adopting a good reform). Therefore, ci can
be interpreted as a measure of her cautiousness or, in a jury context, her
threshold of reasonable doubt. In the baseline model (Secs. III and IV),
we focus on the case with homogeneous cautiousness, where ci is the same for
all common-value agents. In an extension (Sec. V.A) we study the more
general heterogeneous cautiousness cases, where ci may vary across common-
value agents. Private-value agents prefer the status quo Q , irrespective of
the state of nature. Each agent faces an ex ante probability pi ∈ ½0, 1Þ of
being a private-value agent and a probability 1 2 pi of being a common-
value one. We denote the corresponding vector by p ; ðp1, p2, ::: , pnÞ.
Types.—We denote the (realized) type of agent i by vi, where vi 5 vP
for private-value agents and vi 5 ðsi , ciÞ for common-value agents. Thus,
the set of possible types is Θ ; vP [ fsQ , sRg  ð0, 1Þ. We denote by v ;
ðv1, v2, ::: , vnÞ ∈ Θn the vector of realized type profiles in the group.
Mechanisms (or decision rules).—Wedenote byM amechanism that maps
a type profile v into a group decision (this can be a probabilistic map-
ping):
M :Θn→D Q , Rf gð Þ:
Voting systems.—A voting system W is a set of possible actions AW and an
aggregation rule dW mapping agents’ actions into a group decision: dW :
fa ∈ AWgn → fQ , Rg. Themapping implied by a voting system and an as-
sociated equilibrium strategy profile constitutes a mechanism.
The following voting systems are central to our analysis.
Deﬁnition 1. For each k 5 1, 2, ::: , n 2 1, voting system “k-Veto” is
defined by V k ; fAk , dkg, where04, 2018 07:40:19 AM
ww.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
majority rules with veto power 113Ak 5 r , q, vf g,
dk 5
R if X v 5 0 and X r ≥ k
Q otherwise,
(
where Xa denotes the total number of agents playing action a.
Since a single v suffices to enforce the status quoQ , it can be interpreted
as a veto exercised against the reform R. Accordingly, r and q can be inter-
preted as votes for and against the reform. The aggregation rule stipulates
that the reform is implemented if, and only if, there is no veto and there
are at least k votes in favor of R. As such, k can be interpreted as an ap-
proval quorum.
Deﬁnition 2. Voting system “Unanimity” is defined byU ; fAU , dU g,
where
AU 5 r , vf g,
dU 5
R if X v 5 0 and X r 5 n
Q otherwise:
(
Our definition of Unanimity corresponds to the standard in the liter-
ature (see, e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998; Duggan andMartinelli
2001; Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2006).
Remark 1. Unanimity is strategically equivalent to a rule often called
Consensus. Under Consensus, the reform is adopted if no agent opposes
it. Formally, Consensus can be defined by action set {q, v } and the same
decision rule as under Unanimity. Here, q denotes “silent consent.”
Strategy and equilibrium concept.—Following the literature (e.g., Fedder-
sen and Pesendorfer 1998), we focus on responsive symmetric Bayesian
Nash equilibria.Anagent’s strategy is thus a function j :Θ→ DðAWÞ. In par-
ticular, ja(v) denotes the probability with which an agent of type v votes a.
A responsive profile is such that (i) at least some types play action r with
positive probability, and (ii) not all of them play r with probability one.
This ensures that, in equilibrium, some pivot probabilities are strictly pos-
itive; that is, agents affect the outcomeof the vote with positive probability.
Given that the reform R is implemented with positive probability for
any responsive strategy profile, private-value agents always strictly prefer to
vote against R. Thus, they always use their veto under any unanimous rule.
Henceforth, we simply refer to responsive symmetric equilibria as equilibria.III. Equilibrium AnalysisIn this section, we present themain equilibrium results and provide intu-
ition that will be useful to understand the welfare results.This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on September 04, 2018 07:40:19 AM
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AllAny equilibrium under k -Veto satisfies two conditions:
Proposition 1. For any p, j* is an equilibrium under k -Veto if and
only if
i. private-value agents veto the reform, and
ii. j* is an equilibrium of the corresponding game with p 5 0.
Proof. First, recall that v is a strictly dominant strategy for vP -agents.
Therefore, any equilibriumunder k -Veto satisfies point i in the proposition.
Second, given point i, if there exists i such that vi 5 vP , then the group de-
cision is Q irrespective of what any other agent does. Thus, common-
value agents condition their behavior on vi ≠ vP for all i. Therefore, we
have that (1) the strategy profile played by common-value agents in any
equilibrium under k -Veto must form an equilibrium when p 5 0, and
(2) if j* is an equilibrium strategy profile of the game when p 5 0, it
must also be an optimal strategy profile for common-value agents for
all p ≠ 0. QED
On the basis of this result, we focus on the pure common-value game
(p 5 0) to describe the behavior of common-value agents.
For the remainder of this section, we assume that ci is identical for all
common-value agents. For simplicity, we set ci 5 1=2.3 At this point it is
useful to introduce new pieces of notation. First, we denote the (relative)
precision, or likelihood ratio, of signal sQ by
fQ ;
PrðsQ jqQ Þ
PrðsQ jqRÞ ∈ 1,∞ð Þ
and that of signal sR by
fR ;
Pr sR jqRð Þ
PrðsR jqQ Þ ∈ 1,∞ð Þ:
Second, with a slight abuse of notation, we denote by vR (vQ) the type of a
common-value agent who receives signal sR (sQ).
The following lemma extends Austen-Smith and Banks’s (1996) result
on informative voting under k -majority rules to our k -Veto system.
Lemma 1. For each tuple (fQ, fR , n, p), there is a k such that k -Veto
admits an equilibrium in which (i) vR -agents play r and (ii) vQ -agents play q
if fQ < ðfRÞn21, and v otherwise.
Proof. See appendix C.
We now describe equilibrium behavior in greater detail for Veto.
Lemma 2. Under Veto, the pure common-value game admits at most
two equilibria.
Proof. The full characterization of the set of equilibria and the proofs
are in appendix A.3 Given that we consider all possible signal precision, this assumption is without loss of
generality.
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majority rules with veto power 115We now discuss the two possible equilibria in turn.
The information-aggregation equilibrium.—In the first and most interest-
ing equilibrium, agent behavior is easily understood through a series of
simple examples.
First, assume that signal precision is symmetric. That is, fR 5 fQ . In
this case, vR -agents simply play r and vQ -agents play q. The reason is that
both signals have the same information content and the aggregation rule
gives the same weight to r and q votes.
If signal precision is sufficiently asymmetric, agents “compensate”; that
is, agents with the less informative signal mix between r and q. As long as
fQ is not too high (compared to fR), agents do not use their veto power
and their equilibrium behavior is exactly the same as what it would be un-
der simple majority rule. However, when fQ exceeds a certain threshold,
agents with an sQ signal start vetoing with positive probability.
Finally, if fQ ≥ ðfRÞn21, the equilibrium under Veto is unique (and it is
the same as the unique equilibrium under Unanimity). In that case, the
signal sQ is so precise that it becomes a weakly dominant strategy for vQ -
agents to veto (in fact, conditional on observing all the signals, a single
negative signal suffices to convince an agent that the reform is bad).
The best response for vR -agents is to vote r, and the reform is implemented
if and only if there is no vQ -agent.
Remark 2. In the information-aggregation equilibriumof the general
game, agent behavior can be interpreted as a combination of what the
agent would do under Unanimity andmajority rule (without veto power).
Veto indeed allows agents to reproduce any strategy playedundermajority
rule or Unanimity. In particular, they use the veto power to protect their
private interest (which they cannot do undermajority rule), and they vote
against the reform (without vetoing it) when they have a negative, but
nonconclusive, signal about it (which they cannot do under Unanimity).
The Unanimity-like equilibrium.—When fQ < ðfRÞn21, Veto admits a sec-
ond equilibrium. This equilibrium corresponds to the unique equilibrium
under Unanimity, as characterized in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998):
vR -agents vote r, and vQ -agents randomize between r and v.
We see the Unanimity-like equilibrium as a less credible predictor of
agent behavior than the information aggregation equilibrium (see the
discussion in app. A and Bouton, Llorente-Saguer, and Malherbe [2017]).
If agents play the former, outcomes are simply equivalent under Veto and
Unanimity, and the two systems feature identical welfare properties. This
is why the welfare analysis focuses on the information aggregation equi-
librium.IV. Welfare AnalysisIn this section, we study the welfare properties of k -Veto based on the
equilibrium analysis above (i.e., when common-value agents have homo-This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on September 04, 2018 07:40:19 AM
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Allgeneous cautiousness: ci 5 1=2).Wefirst establish that Veto interimdom-
inates Unanimity. We then show that (i) Veto is ex ante efficient when
agents play pure strategies in equilibrium, (ii) there always exists a k -Veto
system that is efficient, and (iii) Veto is asymptotically optimal.A. Efficiency ConceptsUtility.—For a given mechanism M and a given profile v, we can define
e1(M, v) and e2(M, v), the probability that decision R is made in state qQ,
and the probability that decision Q is made in state qR, respectively. There-
fore, they correspond to (ex post) expected probabilities of errors of type I
and II (from a common-value agent’s perspective). We have
e1 M , vð Þ ; PrðqQ jvÞ Pr M vð Þ 5 Rð Þ,
e2 M , vð Þ ; Pr qR jvð Þ Pr M vð Þ 5 Qð Þ:
We are now in a position to define the ex post, interim, and ex ante
utility of an agent i, under any mechanism M:
ui M jvð Þ ; 2cie1 M , vð Þ 2 1 2 cið Þe 2 M , vð Þ,
ui M jvið Þ ; Ev ui M vj Þð jvi½ ,
ui Mð Þ ; Ev ui M jvð Þ½ :
Dominance and efficiency.—We focus on Pareto dominance and efficiency
as formalized by Holmstrom and Myerson (1983).
Deﬁnition 3. Mechanism M interim dominates mechanism M 0 if
uiðM jviÞ ≥ uiðM 0jviÞ, for all i, vi. And M interim strictly dominates M 0 if this
condition also holds with strict inequality for some i and vi.
Ex ante and ex post dominance are defined similarly, and the defini-
tions of efficiency directly follow.
Deﬁnition 4. A mechanism is ex ante (interim, ex post) efficient if
it is not ex ante (interim, ex post) strictly dominated by another mech-
anism.
Note that interim dominance implies ex ante dominance and that ex
ante efficiency implies interim efficiency.
Comparing voting systems.—A voting systemW and an associated strategy
profile j form a mechanism that maps realized type profiles into group
decisions. We denote such a mechanism Wj:
Wj :Θ
n→ D Q , Rf gð Þ:
For what follows, let us adapt the definition of interim dominance and
take into account potential equilibrium multiplicity.
Deﬁnition 5. Voting system W interim dominates voting system W0 if
there exists an equilibrium j under W such that uiðWjjviÞ ≥ uiðW0j0 jviÞ forThis content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on September 04, 2018 07:40:19 AM
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majority rules with veto power 117all equilibria j 0 underW0, for all i, and all vi. AndW interim strictly dominates
W0 if, in each j 0, this condition also holds with strict inequality for some i
and some vi.B. Veto Interim Dominates UnanimityTheorem 1. For all tuples (fQ, fR, n, p), Veto interim (and thus ex
ante) dominates Unanimity, strictly unless fQ ≥ ðfRÞn21.
Proof. See appendix C.
Theorem 1 is a powerful result: it implies that no agent (even after
learning their type) would object to getting rid of Unanimity and using
Veto instead.
The intuition is as follows. First, when there is at least one private-value
agent in the group, the status quo is kept under the two systems. Let us
focus on the cases in which there are only common-value agents and con-
sider vQ - and vR -agents in turn. Under Unanimity, vQ -agents play v with
positive probability. Thus, their interim utility equals the utility of getting
Q with probability one. Since they can also play v under Veto (and get Q
with probability one), they cannot be worse off. By a simple revealed pref-
erence argument, they are strictly better off in the cases in which they
strictly prefer to vote q (which is typical of the information aggregation
equilibrium).
For vR -agents, the intuition goes as follows: under Unanimity the re-
form R is rarely chosen. This implies that the probability of making amis-
take is relatively high in state qR. Given that vR -agents believe that state qR
is more likely than state qQ, their interim utility under Unanimity is low.
Since Veto does not suffer from the same weakness, vR -agents are strictly
better off under Veto than under Unanimity.
One can also establish that the interim dominance of k -Veto over Una-
nimity implies the interim dominance of k0-Veto over Unanimity for k <
k 0 ≤ n. To see the intuition behind this, pick an arbitrary vector of values
forfQ,fR, n, and p and denote k* the quorum such that k*-Veto is efficient
(see theorem 2 below). If k 0 > k* , the quorum is too high to aggregate in-
formation perfectly. However, under Unanimity, the corresponding quo-
rumwould be n, and information aggregation would be even worse. Now,
consider k 0 < k* . In this case, the quorum is too low. But we know that
Veto dominates when k 5 ðn 1 1Þ=2. Therefore, increasing the quorum
(i.e., bringing it closer to k*) can only improve information aggregation.
One cannot conclude, however, that the strict dominance result applies
for all parameter values for all quorums strictly below ðn 1 1Þ=2.C. Is Veto Efficient?We have established that Veto dominates Unanimity, but are there mech-
anisms that dominate Veto?This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on September 04, 2018 07:40:19 AM
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AllGiven our research question, we restrict our attention to unanimous
mechanisms, that is, mechanisms that allow any agent to enforce the sta-
tus quo. In a voting setup, thismeans that agentsmust have veto power. In
a more general mechanism design approach, we capture this restriction
by imposing that, under an admissible mechanism, the interim utility of
all agents is at least as high as their utility under the status quo.
This constraint (which we will refer to as the veto constraint) can be un-
derstood as an interimparticipation constraint, where agents’ outside op-
tion is their utility under the status quo. The veto constraint can equally
be interpreted as resulting from an ex ante participation constraint in a
version of the model in which some agents in some states would have a
sufficiently large disutility from the reform. In this case, agents are willing
to participate ex ante only if themechanism ensures that they will be able
to block any reform that would critically hurt their interest.4
Deﬁnition 6. A mechanism is admissible if it satisfies
uiðM jviÞ ≥ uiðMQ jviÞ 8i,
whereMQ is a trivial mechanism that keeps the status quo for all type pro-
files: MQ ðvÞ 5 Q for all v. We denote by M the set of such admissible
mechanisms.
Since private-value agents dislike the reform irrespective of the state of
nature, all admissible mechanisms must keep the status quo for any type
profile including a private-value agent. This implies that a mechanism’s
relative performance (and its efficiency) can be assessed on the basis of
its outcome for type profiles including only common-value agents.
Henceforth, we will compare only admissiblemechanisms. For instance,
when we state that a mechanism is efficient, this must be understood as
efficient within the set of admissible mechanisms. When relevant, we also
impose incentive compatibility (see Sec. V.A). Given that k -Veto andUna-
nimity give veto power to each agent in the group (and that incentive
compatibility constraints are, by definition, satisfied in equilibrium), both
voting systems at equilibrium are admissible mechanisms.
Lemma 3. The following mechanism is ex ante efficient:
M* vð Þ ;
R if 8i, vi ≠ vP and Pr qR jvð Þ ≥ ci
Q otherwise:
(
Proof. First, note thatM *(v) is admissible. Second, since there is no ex
post disagreement among common-value agents, it is ex post efficient.
Third, there is no admissible mechanism that gives higher ex post utility
to any agent. Thus, it is incentive compatible and ex ante efficient. QED4 Such an interpretation directly speaks to applications such as partnerships or to sover-
eignty issues in the case of international organizations.
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majority rules with veto power 119Deﬁnition 7. Voting systemW is efficient if there exists an equilibrium
j under W such that WjðvÞ 5 M*ðvÞ for all v.
Proposition 2. For all p, Veto is ex ante efficient if
fQ ∈ fRð Þðn21Þ=ðn11Þ, fRð Þðn11Þ=ðn21Þ
 
or fQ ≥ ðfRÞn21.
Proof. The only nontrivial case is one in which the type profile does
not include private-value agents, that is, vi ≠ vP for all i. Consider the
information-aggregation equilibrium characterized in proposition 6 (in
app. A). If
fQ ∈ fRð Þðn21Þ=ðn11Þ, fRð Þðn11Þ=ðn21Þ
 
,
vR -agents play r and vQ -agents play q, and R is chosen if and only if there
are more r -votes than q -votes. However, given that
fQ ∈ fRð Þðn21Þ=ðn11Þ, fRð Þðn11Þ=ðn21Þ
 
,
PrðqR jvÞ > 1=2 if and only if there are more vR -agents than vQ -agents. If
fQ ≥ ðfRÞn21, vR -agents play r and vQ -agents play v; R is thus implemented
only if there are no vQ -agents. But given that fQ ≥ ðfRÞn21, PrðqR jvÞ > 1=2
if and only if there are no vQ -agents. Therefore, Veto at the information-
aggregation equilibrium matches M*(v) for all v. QED
For a voting system to be efficient, it is necessary that agents use pure
strategies (otherwise one cannot have full information revelation). How-
ever, we know from lemma 1 that adjusting the approval quorum k can
induce agents to do so. This leads to the following theorem.5
Theorem 2. For each tuple (fQ, fR, n, p), there exists a k-Veto voting
system that is ex ante efficient.
Proof. If fQ ≥ ðfRÞn21, all k -Veto rules are efficient. If fQ < ðfRÞn21, we
know from lemma 1 that, under k -Veto, for each tuple (fQ, fR, n, p),
there is a k such that the rule admits an equilibrium in which vR -agents
play r and vQ -agents play q. This directly implies that, for such a k, k -Veto
implements R if and only if there are no private-value agents and the
number of sR is greater than or equal to k. Given lemma 3, it remains
to be proven that PrðqR jvÞ ≥ 1=2 if and only if the number of sR signals
is greater than or equal to k. But for vR -agents to play r and vQ -agents to
play q in equilibrium, it must be the case that (i) for any v such that the
number of sR received equals k, PrðqR jvÞ ≥ 1=2, and (ii) for any v such
that the number of sR signals received is equal to k 2 1, 1=2 > PrðqR jvÞ.
QED5 This result is related to theorem 1 in Costinot and Kartik (2007). They show that, in the
standard framework of the Condorcet jury literature with binary states and binary signals,
there is a majority rule that is ex ante efficient. In our setup, however, majority rules are not
admissible (except when p 5 0).
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AllIn practice, it would be useful to have a system that performs well for
different sets of parameters. This is, for instance, the case for a decision
body that presides over many different issues but cannot adapt its voting
system to the question at hand. Unfortunately, there is no k-Veto voting
system that is ex ante efficient for all values of the parameters. However,
as implied above, Veto’s departure from efficiency stems from the use of
mixed strategies. Therefore, increasing the group’s size reduces ineffi-
ciency. As we show in the next section, it vanishes as n increases.D. Asymptotic ResultsIn this subsection, we establish Veto’s appealing asymptotic properties.
Deﬁnition 8. Mechanism M is asymptotically optimal if, with a proba-
bility that tends to one when n tends to infinity, it selects R if q 5 qR and
vi ≠ vP for all i, and Q otherwise.
The decision is optimal if, given the state of nature and the type pro-
file, the reform is adopted if and only if it constitutes a Pareto improve-
ment over the status quo.6
Let p lim denote the limit probability of having at least one private-value
agent in the group:7
p lim ; 1 2 lim
n→∞
Pni51 1 2 pið Þ:
When p lim 5 1, the optimal decision is always to keep the status quo. In
that case, all admissible mechanisms are asymptotically optimal. When
p lim < 1, information aggregation remains relevant in the limit. It turns
out that Veto is asymptotically optimal in this case as well.
Proposition 3. For all fQ, fR , and p, Veto is asymptotically optimal.
Proof. First, given that jvðvPÞ 5 1, we have that for all v such that vi 5
vP for some i, Veto keeps the status quo Q , which is optimal. Second, it is
easy to see that in the information-aggregation equilibrium of Section III,
for any fR and fQ , in the limit, jvðvÞ 5 0  for all v ∈ fvR , vQg. Therefore,
if vi ≠ vP for all i, the outcome under Veto is exactly the same as under
simple majority rule when p 5 0. We know from Feddersen and Pe-
sendorfer (1998) that, when p5 0, simple majority rule aggregates infor-
mation perfectly in the limit; that is, the group chooses R in state qR and
Q in state qQ with a probability that tends to one when n→∞.8 QED
In the case in which p lim < 1, Unanimity is not asymptotically optimal
when it is interim strictly dominated by Veto.6 For Veto and Unanimity, this definition of asymptotic optimality corresponds to the
full information equivalence benchmark used in the Condorcet jury theorem literature.
7 The limit exists, since Pni51ð1 2 piÞmonotonically decreases with n and is bounded be-
low by zero.
8 Although our setup is slightly different from that of Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1998), the proof is almost identical.
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majority rules with veto power 121V. Discussion and ExtensionsIn this section, we first extend our analysis to a version of the model that
allows for disagreement among common-value agents. Then we explore
the consequences of relaxing the veto constraint.A. Preference DiversityTo introduce disagreement among common-value agents, we allow ci to
differ across them. However, to avoid unnecessary complications, we as-
sume that the probability of receiving the correct signal is the same in
both states, that is, PrðsQ jqQ Þ 5 PrðsR jqRÞ 5 p > 1=2.
We adopt a twofold strategy to overcome the technical challenges het-
erogeneous ci’s imply. First, we focus on a case with three agents and two
levels of cautiousness. In this case, the model is still analytically tractable:
we are able to fully characterize equilibria and, for some values of the pa-
rameters, establish the welfare results analytically. We use numerical meth-
ods otherwise.
Second, we study the asymptotic properties of Veto. This is the stan-
dard approach for analyzing models with rich preference structure, signal
space, and/or state space. We show that Veto is still asymptotically optimal
(and thus interim dominates Unanimity when n is sufficiently large).1. Three AgentsThere are three common-value agents that may differ in their level of
cautiousness.9 Agents can be neutral, in which case they have the same
cautiousness parameter as before (cN 5 1=2), or cautious, with cH ∈
ð1=2, 1Þ. That is, cautious agents dislike errors of type I (adopting a
bad reform) relatively more than errors of type II (not adopting a good
reform). Ex ante, agents face an identical probability r ∈ ½0, 1Þ of being
cautious.
Example.—To provide intuition on agent behavior and why Veto still
dominates Unanimity, we first focus on parameter values for which there
is a pure strategy equilibrium under Veto. Suppose that (i) r is not too
high (see below for details), and (ii) cautious agents, if they could ob-
serve all signals, prefer the reform only if there are three signals sR (by
construction, neutral agents prefer the reform if there are at least two
signals sR).
Under Veto, there is an equilibrium such that cautious agents vote q if
they receive a signal sR, and they veto if they receive a signal sQ; neutral
agents vote r if they receive a signal sR, and they vote q if they receive a
signal sQ. Under Unanimity, if cH is high enough, cautious agents veto ir-9 We do not include private-value agents because this would not affect the results.
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Allrespective of their signal. Neutral agents vote r if they receive a signal sR ,
and they mix between r and v with a signal sQ.
Why does Veto interim dominate Unanimity? First, if there are only
neutral agents, Veto aggregates information perfectly (which leads to
the right decision from their common viewpoint), but Unanimity does
not. Second, if there is at least one cautious agent, (i) under Unanimity,
the status quo always remains; and (ii) under Veto, the status quo remains
except in the case in which all agents receive an sR signal and at most one
of them is cautious. But when that is the case, R is the only ex post effi-
cient, and therefore “right,” decision. Thus, Veto strictly interim domi-
nates Unanimity.
Generalization.—We can characterize an equilibrium for all values of
the parameters under both Veto and Unanimity. The example above cor-
responds to
cH ∈
p2
p2 1 1 2 pð Þ2 ,
p3
p3 1 1 2 pð Þ3
 
and r ≤ 1=2. On the basis of this characterization, we are able to analyt-
ically prove that Veto interim dominates Unanimity for two other sets of
parameter values: if cH ≤ p or cH ≥ p3=½p3 1 ð1 2 pÞ3. In both cases, the
intuition from the baseline model is useful: when cH ≤ p, cautious agents
are essentially neutral agents because there is no ex post disagreement;
when cH ≥ p3=½p3 1 ð1 2 pÞ3, it is a weakly dominant strategy for cau-
tious agents to veto the reform irrespective of their signal. Thus, they be-
have like private-value agents. The interim dominance result of theorem 1
therefore readily extends.
For other parameter values, tractability is an issue. We use the follow-
ing numerical approach. First, we generate a grid for cH ∈ ½1=2, 1, r ∈
ð0, 1Þ, and p ∈ ð1=2, 1Þ in steps of 0.001. Second, for each parameter
combination, we compute interim utility (up to a precision of 1E210)
for each type of agent under both systems based on our analytical char-
acterization of equilibrium. Veto both interim and ex ante strictly dom-
inates Unanimity for all parameter combinations in the grid.
Efficiency.—When common-value agents may disagree ex post, incen-
tive compatibility constraints must be taken into account. For each point
of the parameter grid, we consider all pure mechanisms—that is, all pos-
sible mappings from type profiles into pure decisions (M :Θn→fR ,Qg).
For each of these mechanisms, we compute interim utility uiðM jviÞ un-
der truthful revelation and discard those that are not admissible or in-
centive compatible. Our efficiency benchmark M *IC is the mechanism
that maximizes ex ante utility among the remaining candidates.
Three major patterns emerge (see the online appendix for more de-
tails). First, Veto matches M*IC when cH takes either low or high values.This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on September 04, 2018 07:40:19 AM
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majority rules with veto power 123In contrast, Unanimity is always ex ante strictly dominated by M *IC . Sec-
ond, for intermediate values of cH, Veto does not match M*IC , but it gen-
erates fairly close levels of ex ante utility. For a certain range of parame-
ters, Veto even strictly ex ante dominates M*IC .
10 Finally, when Veto is ex
ante strictly dominated byM *IC , Unanimity is dominated byM
*
IC by a mar-
gin that is typically an order of magnitude larger (when both r and cH are
large, however, this margin decreases).2. Large GroupsTo explore the asymptotic properties of Veto (and Unanimity) and allow
for private-value agents, we adapt the setup of Gerardi (2000). With prob-
ability pi ∈ ½0, 1Þ, agent i is a private-value agent (vi 5 vP). With prob-
ability 1 2 pi, agent i has common value with cautiousness ci drawn from
a probability distribution F with support on the interval ðc, cÞ, with 0 ≤
c < p < c < 1.11 As in Gerardi (2000), we assume that F is continuous, is
strictly increasing, and admits a density f, such that limx→ c f ðxÞ > 0 and
limx→ c f ðxÞ > 0. Our definition of asymptotic optimality (definition 8)
still applies.
The main advantage of considering a setup (almost) identical to that
of Gerardi (2000) is that we can use his results about nonunanimous
rules in our proof of the following result.
Proposition 4. For all fQ, fR, and p, Veto is asymptotically optimal.
Proof. See the online appendix.
As in the baseline model, Veto gives private-value agents the power to
enforce the status quo without affecting the behavior of common-value
agents. The crux of the matter is to understand why the most cautious
common-value agents (i.e., those with a large ci) do not want to use their
veto power.
When other common-value agents play the equilibrium strategy under
majority rule, the expected outcome is R in state qR and Q in state qQ.
Therefore, by vetoing the reform, a common-value agent is more likely
to prevent a desirable reform than an undesirable one. As the size of
the group grows larger, the relative likelihood of a mistake tends to infin-
ity, whence no common-value agent wants to veto the reform.
In our setup, we can show that an asymptotically optimal mechanism
interim strictly dominates any mechanism that is not asymptotically op-
timal. On the basis of this, we get the following result.10 This is possible when the equilibrium is in mixed strategies.
11 In Gerardi (2000), c 5 1. In our context, this case is somehow extreme (and unnec-
essarily complicates the analysis because of an order-of-limits issue). When c 5 1, there
may be distribution functions such that the probability of having an agent who behaves
as a private-value agent (because she has very high cautiousness) tends to one when n tends
to infinity. In these particular cases, Veto and Unanimity would then both be asymptotically
optimal.
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AllProposition 5. For all fQ, fR, and p, for n sufficiently large, Veto in-
terim dominates Unanimity.
Proof. See the online appendix.B. Nonunanimous Decision MakingOur analysis focuses on information aggregation when there is a veto
constraint. In many of the applications we have in mind, this constraint
emerges from the need to protect single individuals (or states). Thus,
the veto constraint can be interpreted as an extreme need for minority
protection. But what if the minority in question is larger than one?
Minority larger than one.—Consider a group of n agents whose objective
is to implement the reform if and only if two conditions are satisfied:
(i) it is against the private interests of no more than f agents, and (ii) the
reform is good (from the common-value agent standpoint). Which vot-
ing system should they use?
Veto achieves this objective for f5 0. We conjecture that the following
simple rules would achieve this objective for f > 0 (because, similarly to
k-Veto, they make it easier for agents to dissociate the minority protec-
tion dimension from the information aggregation dimension). Under
these rules, the action set is the same as under Veto (i.e., {r, q, v}), and
the aggregation rule is
df 5
R if Xv ≤ f and X r ≥
n 1 1
2
Q otherwise:
8<
:
That is, the reform is adopted if and only if no more than f agents vote v
and a majority vote r. Here, v is a strong action against the reform, but it
is no longer a veto.
If these rules indeed show properties similar to those of Veto, this
would provide an argument for the so-called filibuster procedure, which
exists in many parliamentary systems, as a way to balance minority pro-
tection and information aggregation.12
Veto versus majority rules.—Now imagine that there is no minority to
protect. For instance, consider a pure common-value setup (i.e., p 5 0).
Can we say something of the comparison of Veto and majority rule? The
answer is yes: Veto ex antedominatesmajority rule (strictly when v is played
with positive probability in the information-aggregation equilibrium un-12 We are very grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this extension and its ap-
plication to the filibuster procedure.
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majority rules with veto power 125der Veto).13 To understand why Veto dominates majority rule, first note
that any strategy profile under majority rule can be reproduced under
Veto. Second, recall from McLennan (1998) that in a pure common-
value environment, a strategy profile producing themaximal ex ante util-
ity must be an equilibrium. Therefore, there always exists an equilibrium
under Veto that produces an ex ante utility at least as high as in the
unique equilibrium under majority rule. However, Veto has a larger ac-
tion set, which proves useful in cases in which the negative signal is pre-
cise enough. These are the cases in which Veto strictly dominatesmajority
rule.VI. Empirical Relevance and ApplicationsIn this section, we discuss the empirical relevance of our analysis. First,
we argue that international organizations often combine an information
aggregation problem in a common-value environment with a veto con-
straint and factors that limit timely and truthful communication.14 To ar-
gue this point, we discuss the UN Security Council. It is particularly rel-
evant because it suggests that using Veto instead of Unanimity does
indeed improve outcome efficiency. We then extend the argument to in-
ternational organizations in general.
Second, we discuss our results in the context of a vast literature that
views trials by jury as an information aggregation problem in which the
voting system plays a crucial role. One of the main policy debates focuses
on whether to use Unanimity or some form of majority rule. We argue
that our results may bring the two sides of this debate closer together.A. International OrganizationsThe Charter of the United Nations is explicit about the common-value
dimension: it proclaims that the peoples of the United Nations resolve
to combine their efforts to accomplish common aims (international peace,
economic and social advancement of all people, etc.). It grounds these
aims in the ideals of justice and fundamental human rights.
The charter also states that the Security Council shall make decisions
based on an affirmative vote of nine members, which must include the13 See proposition 10 in the online appendix. This is related to the result of Duggan and
Martinelli (2001) that unanimity rule can dominate nonunanimous rules for some struc-
tures of information.
14 In our model, when ci’s are identical, if prevote communication is allowed and costless,
there exist efficient equilibria in which voters truthfully reveal their types in the communi-
cation stage and vote for the optimal group decision in the voting stage (this is a trivial ex-
tension of proposition 8 inCoughlan [2000], in which we allow agents to communicate their
type). In that case, we can simply think of k-Veto as a method of formalizing information ag-
gregation that might otherwise be accomplished through communication.
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Allconcurring votes of the permanent members. This, in effect, gives veto
power to each permanent member. However, as noted on the UN web-
site, “If a permanent member does not fully agree with a proposed res-
olution but does not wish to cast a veto, it may choose to abstain, thus
allowing the resolution to be adopted if it obtains the required number
of nine favorable votes.”With the exception that only five countries have
veto power, this corresponds to a k-Veto rule, with an approval quorum
(k) of nine out of 15 members. Indeed, the 10 elected members can vote
yes, no, or abstain. The five permanent members can vote yes, veto, or ab-
stain. In both cases, abstention counts as a no.
The origin of veto power for the permanent members has been linked
to their desire to protect their sovereignty (see, e.g., Reston 1946; Lee
1947; Posner and Sykes 2014) and to implementability concerns (see,
e.g., Winter 1996). The sovereignty issue is well illustrated by President
Truman in his memoirs. He wrote, “In the present world setup sovereign
powers are very jealous of their rights. We had to recognize this as a con-
dition and to seek united action through compromise” (1965, 311). On
implementability concerns,Winter (1996, 813) writes, “The idea of grant-
ing permanent members veto power evolved directly from the fact that
the enforcement of many Security Council resolutions would require
the military and financial support of the superpowers. Hence, without the
unanimous consent of the permanent members, no effective implemen-
tation of Security Council resolutions could be expected.”
Furthermore, major nations made it clear that their participation, and
therefore the existence of the organization itself, was conditional on hav-
ing veto power: “At San Francisco, the issue was made crystal clear by the
leaders of the Big Five: it was either the Charter with the veto or no Char-
ter at all” (Wilcox 1945, 954).
Even if members share common aims, they may still have vested inter-
ests and/or different views about how to best achieve these aims. In such
a context, it seems hardly plausible that full, truthful, and timely commu-
nication is always possible and incentive compatible. The best way to il-
lustrate this is perhaps to use an example. In March 1994, in the run-up
to the Rwandan genocide, a number of key actors were aware of alarming
pieces of intelligence (e.g., the mass training of militias, the establish-
ment of weapon caches, and the registration of ethnic Tutsis in the cap-
ital, Kigali). Subsequent evidence shows that this intelligence was not
shared with the Security Council at the time key decisions were made.15
The voting rule used by the Security Council has evolved with time,
and practice, in the direction predicted by our results. Article 27(3) of15 See the report from the National Assembly of France (http://www.assemblee-nationale
.fr/dossiers/rwanda/r1271.asp) and the declassified documents from the National Security
Archive (http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/Rw01.pdf).
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majority rules with veto power 127the Charter of the United Nations makes clear that a voluntary absten-
tion by a permanent member should be treated as a veto. But this was
an early point of contention. Senator Tom Connally (US Delegate to
the General Assembly of November 15, 1946) stated, “As it stands today
a great power may find itself in the utterly ridiculous situation of vot-
ing for a measure which it does not entirely approve or else blocking
the wheels of justice by the unwilling use of its veto. There should be
some middle ground if the machinery of peaceful settlement is to func-
tion smoothly” (cited in Fassbender [1998, 182]). Such a middle ground
emerged naturally as a common practice of the Security Council (Liang
1950; Stavropoulos 1967; Sievers and Daws 2014). As explained by Stav-
ropoulos (1967, 742), “It has been the consistent practice of the Security
Council to interpret a voluntary abstention by a permanent member as
not tantamount to a veto.” The direct consequence of this practice is well
summarized by Fassbender (1998, 181–82): “Voluntary abstention made
it possible for a permanent member to express its reservations about a
particular decision while not obstructing it.”16 That such a possibility en-
hances information aggregation is the key mechanism behind our re-
sults.
Permanent members have repeatedly made use of the option to ab-
stain. As a result, resolutions are frequently adopted without the explicit
support of all five permanent members.17 The most striking example
might be Resolution 344: “On 15 December 1973, Resolution 344 was
carried by the votes of the non-permanent members, with all five perma-
nent members abstaining” (Felsenthal and Machover 2001, 98).18
Consistent with our analysis, some observers of the UN seem to agree
that interpreting a voluntary abstention by a permanent member as not
tantamount to a veto did improve decision making in the Security Coun-
cil. For instance, Liang (1950, 707) points out that “had the abstentions
been considered as negative votes, the Security Council would have16 The Council of the European Union offers a parallel. Indeed, the Treaty of Amster-
dam (1997) introduced a key novelty for matters of Common Foreign and Security Policy:
instead of Unanimity, the voting procedure became unanimity rule under the constructive
abstention regime. In that case, if more than a third of the member states (or member
states representing more than a third of the EU population) abstain “constructively,” the
proposal is rejected. This rule formally corresponds to k -Veto, with a quorum of two-thirds
of the votes.
17 As tallied by Felsenthal and Machover (2001, 98), “In the period 1946–97, this hap-
pened in the case of 300 resolutions—well over 28% of the total 1068 resolutions adopted
by the UNSC.” Between 1998 and 2015, we counted 52 additional occurrences (voting records
are available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/).
18 Also, as explained by Sievers and Daws (2014, 316–17), “Although it does not often
happen, a resolution can fail to be adopted, not because of a veto, but because it does
not garner sufficient affirmative votes. In contemporary practice, such instances are usually
the result of a miscalculation of the voting intentions of the Council members by the spon-
sors of a draft resolution.”
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Alladopted very few substantive decisions in its more than four years’ history.”
Additionally, Delbruck ([1977] 1996, 302) argues that the UN Security
Council “interpreted its voting rules in a way not in conformity with the
respective wording of the Charter law, clearly in line, however, with the
purposes and principles of the Charter, since this interpretation enabled
the Security Council to act more adequately in the field of peacekeeping”
(cited in Fassbender [1998, 182]).
As a matter of fact, the early reasons for, and discussion of, abstaining
put forth by the permanent members can be illuminating. For instance,
in 1947, the UK representative justified his abstention on Resolution 27
as follows: “The UK has abstained; but in view of the fact that everybody
here clearly wishes this war to stop, the UK does not wish its abstention to
be treated as a veto invalidating the resolution which has otherwise se-
cured the necessary majority” (cited in Gross [1951, 216]).
The argument easily generalizes beyond the UN Security Council.
First, the principle of national sovereignty is a pillar of international law.
It implies that international organizations are limited in terms of themea-
sures that they can effectively impose on member states. In practice, this
imposes a constraint on which decision rules they can use (see, e.g., Za-
mora 1980; Tsebelis 2002; Sieberson 2010; Cogen 2015).19 Accordingly,
Blake and Lockwood Payton (2015) find that 35 percent of the 266 in-
tergovernmental organizations included in their database use unanimous
decision making in their supreme decision-making body.
Moreover, the charters of many other international organizations leave
no doubt that the promotion of common values is one of their main
raisons d’être. Koremenos (2013) studies such reasons empirically andfinds
the resolution of uncertainty crucial. She states, “Uncertainty about the
State of the World is the most common cooperation problem: two-thirds
of the [intergovernmental] agreements attempt to solve it. The pervasive-
ness of such uncertainty is not surprising, given the numerous potential
domestic and technological shocks that may affect international coopera-
tion” (663). She also finds uncertainty about the behavior and prefer-
ences (of others) to be important.
Finally, there are many factors that hinder informal communication in
international organizations (see Persico 2004). For instance, opportu-
nity cost of time and urgency can put a limit on the time allocated to in-
formation exchange and debate. Information can also be classified or
difficult to interpret by agents with different technical backgrounds.More-
over, despite the important common-value dimension, differences of views19 For instance, Posner and Sykes (2014) point out that nations are much more likely to
be willing to accept nonunanimous voting systems in organizations whose decisions cannot
impose high costs on its members. However, countries would also benefit from committing
to ex ante beneficial agreements, although they may sometimes wind up on the losing end
(see Maggi and Morelli 2006).
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majority rules with veto power 129or vested interests are likely to restrict truthful communication. This issue
is particularly salient when agents have veto power (Austen-Smith and
Feddersen 2006).B. Trials by JuryThere is a vast literature that views trials by jury as an information aggre-
gation problem in which the voting system plays a crucial role. The de-
bate focuses on whether verdicts should be unanimous. The typical argu-
ment for the need for unanimous verdicts is that “it is a widely held belief
among legal theorists that the requirement of unanimous jury verdicts in
criminal trials reduces the likelihood of convicting an innocent defen-
dant” (Coughlan 2000, 375). After all, according to Neilson and Winter
(2005, 2), “the prevention of a wrongful conviction is a well-established
goal of the legal system.”
A rebuttal is put forth by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998). They
show that in a game theory setup, nonunanimous verdicts protect the in-
nocent better. This argument, which has triggered reactions and chal-
lenges (see, e.g., Coughlan 2000; Gerardi 2000; Duggan and Martinelli
2001; Persico 2004; Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2006), has not been
used successfully by proponents of nonunanimous verdicts.20 Our results
suggest a new angle in this debate because k-Veto rules combine the
strengths of both Unanimity and majority rules: they foster information
aggregation while still granting every juror the power to prevent a con-
viction.VII. ConclusionIn our view, in addition to their strong theoretical properties, the sim-
plicity of k-Veto rules makes them particularly appealing for real-world
applications. As we have discussed, there are voting bodies that use this
voting system or slight variations thereof. Still, many voting bodies use
unanimity or consensus, including international organizations such as
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Council of the European
Union on most sensitive topics (excluding the Common Foreign and Se-
curity Policy), and the Southern Common Market (Mercosur). Our re-
sults suggest that (i) they should consider using a k-Veto rule instead,
and (ii) such an institutional reform should not encounter much resis-
tance.20 Advocates of nonunanimous verdicts may also contend that “non-unanimous verdict
protects the jury from the obstinacy of the erratic or otherwise unreasonable holdout juror,
decreases the likelihood of a hung jury, and reduces the costs associated with re-trying a
case when the jury fails to reach a verdict” (Diamond, Rose, and Murphy 2006, 204).
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AllAny call for reform should, however, be supported by strong empirical
evidence. Our companion paper, Bouton et al. (2017), is a first step in
that direction. We compare Veto and Unanimity through a series of con-
trolled laboratory experiments. By and large, we find strong support for
the dominance of Veto over Unanimity.Appendix A
Equilibrium Analysis under Veto
Proposition 1 greatly simplifies the characterization of any equilibrium under
Veto since it allows us to focus on the pure common-value game in which p 5 0.
We organize the equilibrium analysis as follows: first, we define the pivotal
events, compute their probabilities, and derive the possible actions’ expected
payoffs. Second, we characterize the set of equilibria. Finally, we argue that only
one equilibrium is relevant.
In the common-value game, there are n common-value agents, that is, vi ∈
fvQ , vRg for all i. We will often refer to vQ and vR as signals instead of types.
Agents’ behavior depends on pivotal events: situations in which their vote
changes the final outcome toward a specific group decision. In other words,
an agent is pivotal if the group decision would be different without her vote.
Whether a vote is pivotal therefore depends on the decision rule and on all other
agents’ behavior. Agents’ behavior, in turn, depends on their strategies and on
the signal they receive. Thus, for any strategy profile, it is possible to compute
the probability of each pivotal event.
At this point, it is useful to introduce two new objects. First, xa denotes, from
the perspective of a given agent, the number of other agents playing action a. Sec-
ond, tqa ðjÞ denotes the state-contingent probability that an agent votes a in state
q for a given strategy profile j. It is defined as follows:
tqa jð Þ ; o
v∈fvQ ,vRg
ja vð Þ PrðvjqÞ,
where PrðvR jqÞ 5 PrðsR jqÞ and PrðvQ jqÞ 5 PrðsQ jqÞ for all q since p 5 0.
Pivot Probabilities and Payoffs
Under Veto, there are two pivotal events. First, an r -vote is pivotal when, without
that vote, R is lacking just one vote to be adopted (i.e., xr 5 ðn 2 1Þ=2 and no-
body casts a v -vote). We denote that pivotal event in state q by piv qR . Second,
a v -vote is pivotal when the number of r-votes among other agents is larger
than or equal to the quorum (i.e., xr ≥ ðn 1 1Þ=2) and nobody else casts a
v -vote. We denote that pivotal event in state q by pivqQ . Importantly, a q -ballot
is never pivotal under Veto. Indeed, this would require that, without that vote, R
wins (i.e., xr ≥ ðn 1 1Þ=2), and, with that vote, Q wins (i.e., xr < ðn 1 1Þ=2), an
impossibility.
For the sake of readability, our notation does not reflect the fact that the prob-
ability of pivotal events depends on the strategies through the expected vote
shares; that is, we henceforth omit j from the notation.This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on September 04, 2018 07:40:19 AM
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majority rules with veto power 131For pivqR , we have
PrðpivqRÞ 5
n 2 1
n 2 1
2
0
@
1
Aðtqq Þðn21Þ=2 tqrð Þðn21Þ=2: (A1)
Similarly, for pivqQ we have
PrðpivqQ Þ 5 o
n21
j5ðn11Þ=2
n 2 1
j
 !
tqrð Þjðtqq Þn212j : (A2)
Using these pivot probabilities, we can compute the expected payoff of the dif-
ferent actions for a common-value agent of type v ∈ fvQ , vRg. To do this, it is use-
ful to define common-value agents’ interim beliefs about the state of nature:
PrðqQ jvÞ 5 PrðvjqQ Þ
PrðvjqQ Þ 1 PrðvjqRÞ ,  
PrðqR jvÞ 5 PrðvjqRÞ
PrðvjqRÞ 1 PrðvjqQ Þ :
Therefore, we have that the expected payoff of an r -vote for a common-value
agent who received signal v is
Gðr jvÞ 5 Pr qR jvð Þ PrðpivqRR Þ 2 PrðqQ jvÞ PrðpivqQR Þ, (A3)
the expected payoff of a v -vote for a common-value agent who received signal v is
GðvjvÞ 5 PrðqQ jvÞ PrðpivqQQ Þ 2 Pr qR jvð Þ PrðpivqRQ Þ, (A4)
and the expected payoff of a q -vote for a common-value agent who received sig-
nal v is
G qjvð Þ 5 0: (A5)
The Information-Aggregation Equilibrium
To organize the discussion of the equilibrium behavior of common-value agents
under Veto, it is useful to partition the parameter space. The reason is that equi-
librium strategies are nontrivially affected by the relative precision of the signals.
We denote the precision of a signal vQ by fQ ; PrðvQ jqQ Þ= PrðvQ jqRÞ ∈ ð1,∞Þ and
that of signal vR by fR ; PrðvR jqRÞ= PrðvR jqQ Þ ∈ ð1,∞Þ.21 For any n and fR, we
have identified four thresholds f1, f2, f3, and f4 for fQ, at which the set of ac-
tions played with strictly positive probability in equilibrium changes. The next21 Conversely, we have
PrðvQ jqQ Þ 5 1 2 fRð ÞfQ
1 2 fQfR
ndaPrðvQ jqR Þ 5 1 2 fR
1 2 fQfR
:
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Allproposition characterizes these thresholds and the equilibrium associated with
it.
Proposition 6 (Information-aggregation equilibrium). For each tuple (fR,
fQ, n) there exist unique thresholds f1, f2, f3, and f4 (with 1 < f1 < f2 ≤ f3 ≤
f4 < ∞) such that the following strategy profile is a responsive symmetric equilib-
rium under Veto:
jr vRð Þ 5 1 2 e* 2 g*, jq vRð Þ 5 e* 1 g*, jv vRð Þ 5 0,
jr ðvQ Þ 5 h*, jqðvQ Þ 5 1 2 h* 2 d*, jvðvQ Þ 5 d*,
where h*, e*, g*, and d* are unique and satisfy the following properties:
fQ < f1 fQ ∈ [f1, f2] fQ ∈ (f2, f3] fQ ∈ (f3, f4) fQ ≥ f4
h* [0, 1) 0 0 0 0
e* 0 0 (0, 1) 0 0
g* 0 0 0 (0, 1 2 d*) 0
d* 0 0 0 (0, 1) 1 use subjec
This content do
t to University wnloaded from 128.0
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Figure A1 illustrates proposition 6 in the space (fR, fQ) for n5 7. In short, the
voting behavior under Veto is as follows. For fQ ∈ ½1, f3, the behavior of common-
value agents under Veto is the same as it would be under majority rule, and for
fQ ∈ ½f4,∞Þ, it is the same as it would be under Unanimity. For fQ ∈ ðf3, f4Þ, all
actions are played with positive probability. Therefore, the behavior under Veto
is necessarily different than under majority rule or Unanimity. We now detail the
mechanisms behind the behavior of common-value agents for the different val-
ues of fQ.
When fQ ∈ ½f1, f2, the precision of the two signals is not too different. The
equilibrium is then such that jr ðvRÞ 5 1 5 jqðvQ Þ: common-value agents vote
their signal and do not use their veto. The intuition is the following. An r-ballot
is pivotal if there are ðn 2 1Þ=2 votes for R in the group of other agents. Given
the strategy under consideration, this requires that in the group of other agents,
there are ðn 2 1Þ=2 signals vQ and ðn 2 1Þ=2 signals vR. Adding one’s own signal
to this count means a lead of one signal in favor of one of the two states. The
condition fQ ∈ ½f1, f2 ensures that, in such a case, the posterior beliefs of the
agent under consideration are in line with her signal. In other words, condi-
tional on an r -ballot being pivotal, vR -agents believe that R is best and vQ -agents
believe that Q is best. The implication in terms of voting behavior is obvious for
vR -agents: they vote for r. For vQ -agents, the situation is slightly more compli-
cated since there are two options to vote against R : voting either q or v. A q -ballot
has an expected payoff of zero, whereas a v -ballot has a negative expected pay-
off. This is so because a v-ballot changes the outcome when there are ðn 1 1Þ=2
or more r votes. Given the strategy under consideration and the relative preci-
sion of the signals, this is more likely to happen in state qR than in state qQ.
When fQ ∈ ½1, f1Þ, signal vR is more precise than signal vQ. In that case, vQ -
agents prefer to overlook their signal and vote r with positive probability. Doing
so, they “compensate” for the bias in the information structure. The reason is19 AM
hicago.edu/t-and-c).
majority rules with veto power 133that, because the signal is imprecise, the probability of making a mistake in state
qR is too high. This is exactly the same behavior as under majority rule.
The case with fQ ∈ ðf2, f3 resembles the one with fQ ∈ ½1, f1Þ, but the differ-
ence in signal precision is in favor of vQ. As a result of the difference in signal
precision, vR -agents prefer to overlook their signal and vote against R with posi-
tive probability. Again, this is similar to the case under majority rule. Yet, under
Veto agents have two ways to vote against R : voting q or v. The appeal of v de-
pends positively on the precision of the vQ signal and negatively on the relative
probability of being pivotal in favor of Q in states qR and qQ. Therefore, f3 re-
quires that, for a given precision of the vQ signal, the expected lead of R in state
qR is large enough and/or the lead of Q in state qQ small enough.
When fQ ∈ ðf3, f4Þ, the situation resembles the situation for fQ ∈ ðf2, f3. The
difference is that vQ -agents want to use their veto power with positive probability.
As just explained, this is so because, for the strategy profile when fQ ∈ ðf2, f3,
the expected lead of R in state qR is too large in comparison to the expected leadFIG. A1.—Equilibrium strategies under Veto for n 5 7. The letters in parentheses refer
to the strategy of the common-value agents. The first element of each couple refers to the
strategy of vQ -agents. The second element of each couple refers to the strategy of vR -agents.
Pure strategies are denoted by single letters; mixed strategies are denoted by coupled letters.This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on September 04, 2018 07:40:19 AM
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Allof Q in state qQ. In equilibrium, (1) vR -agents mix between r and q, but they vote r
with higher probability than for fQ ≤ f3; and (2) vQ -agents mix between q and
v. The intuition comes in two steps. First, the positive probability of a veto by
vQ -agents makes a vote r more appealing; that is, PrðpivqRR Þ= PrðpivqQR Þ goes up
since there are more vQ -agents in state qQ. Second, the relatively higher vote
shares of R in state qR make a v-vote less appealing; that is, PrðpivqRQ Þ goes up
and PrðpivqQQ Þ goes down.
When fQ ∈ ½f4,∞Þ, common-value agents behave as they would under Una-
nimity. The vQ signal is so precise (relatively) that one vQ signal is sufficient infor-
mation to conclude that Q is better than R (even if all other signals are vR sig-
nals). Therefore, vQ -agents prefer to cast a v -vote. For vR -agents, the situation
is different. Given the strategy under consideration, conditional on being pivotal,
all other agents must have received a vR -signal. Obviously, if there are only vR sig-
nals, any agent must believe that state qR is more likely than state qQ. She thus pre-
fers to cast an r-vote.
The Unanimity-Like Equilibrium
We show here that, when fQ < f4, there exists another symmetric responsive
equilibrium that corresponds to the unique equilibrium under Unanimity (in
the next subsection, we show that this is the only other equilibrium). However,
such an equilibrium is not robust under Veto (see discussion below). We there-
fore see it as of little relevance.
Proposition 7 (Unanimity-like equilibrium). If fQ < f4, the following strat-
egy profile is a responsive symmetric equilibrium under Veto:
jr vRð Þ 5 1, jq vRð Þ 5 0, jv vRð Þ 5 0,
jr ðvQ Þ 5 a*, jqðvQ Þ 5 0, jvðvQ Þ 5 1 2 a*,
where
a* 5
ðfQ 2 1Þ fR 2 ðfQ Þ1=ðn21Þ
 
fR 2 1ð Þ ðfQ Þ1=ðn21ÞfQ 2 1
  ∈ ½0, 1Þ:
This equilibrium corresponds to the unique equilibrium under Unanimity.
Proof. Straightforward extension of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998). See
appendix B for detail.
Under Unanimity, vQ -agents realize they can be pivotal only if all other agents
vote r. Given that this is more likely to happen in state qR (because vR -agents al-
ways play r), vQ -agents play v with probability one only if signal sQ is sufficiently
precise (fQ ≥ f4). In all other cases, they play r with positive probability, which
results in a relatively high probability of errors of both types (Feddersen and
Pesendorfer 1998).
To understand why it is also an equilibrium under Veto, remember that we can
redefine Unanimity using the same decision rule as under Veto. ThenUnanimity
corresponds to Veto with a smaller action set. That is, action q is not available un-
der Unanimity. Under Veto, when no other agent ever votes q, a q -vote is strate-
gically equivalent to an r-vote (since the approval quorum is satisfied with prob-This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on September 04, 2018 07:40:19 AM
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majority rules with veto power 135ability one, the reform will be adopted unless someone vetoes it).22 So the equi-
librium under Unanimity must be an equilibrium under Veto.
However, we see several reasons to question the robustness of such an equilib-
rium under Veto. First, as we show in the welfare analysis, it is Pareto dominated
by the information-aggregation equilibrium.
Second, it is instable in the following sense. Imagine that vQ -agents tremble and
play q with very small but strictly positive probability y (in equilibrium, they are in-
different between the three possible actions), while vR -agents still play r with prob-
ability one. Then a best response for vQ -agents cannot involve playing both r and v
with strictly positive probability; that is, it cannot be “close” to the equilibrium strat-
egy profile. In fact, as y tends to zero, the equilibrium of such a perturbed game
tends to the information-aggregation equilibrium. The intuition is the following:
in the unanimity-like equilibrium, agents are indifferent between q and r because
one can never be pivotal in favor ofR (if no other agent has vetoed, then itmust be
that everyone else played r, and there already is a majority in favor of the reform).
But if q is played with positive probability, even very small, it becomes possible
that xr 5 ðn 2 1Þ=2. Since this is more likely to happen in state Q than in state
R, a vQ -agent then strictly prefers to vote q than r. Note that if vQ-agents do not
play r, this decreases the gain for them to play v, and the equilibrium unravels.23
Finally, we present in a companion paper the results of an experimental study
that strongly supports the prediction that agents will coordinate on the information-
aggregation equilibrium rather than the unanimity-like equilibrium (see Bouton
et al. 2017).
No Other Equilibria
We show that there cannot be other responsive symmetric equilibria than those
described in propositions 6 and 7. The proof is rather straightforward but quite
tedious, so we organize it with the matrix in figure A2 that considers all the pos-
sible classes of (symmetric) strategy profiles. Possible classes of strategy for an
agent are given by {r, rq, q, qv, v, qrv, rv}, where for instance rq means that this
agent plays r and q (but not v) with strictly positive probability.
We show in five steps that the only possible equilibria correspond to the
information-aggregation equilibrium (cells “IAE”) and the unanimity-like one
(cells “ULE”).
First, note that if agent vQ plays r with positive probability at equilibrium, it
must be the case that agent vR plays r with probability one because signals are in-
formative. Formally, from equations (A3), (A4), and (A5), we have
Gðr jvQ Þ ≥ 0 ⇒ Gðr jvRÞ > 0
and22 In terms of information aggregation, playing q at such an equilibrium could convey
information, but such information would not be exploited in making the group decision.
23 The equilibrium is, however, trembling-hand perfect because it is possible to find a
joint sequence of tremble for all agents that tends to zero and a corresponding sequence
of equilibria that converges toward the equilibrium. However, it is easy to show that such
sequences must have the unappealing feature that trembles make agents vR more likely to
vote for q than agents vQ.
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AllGðr jvQ Þ ≥ GðvjvQ Þ ⇒ Gðr jvRÞ > GðvjvRÞ:
Similarly, if agent vR plays v with positive probability, then agent vQ plays v with
probability one. These two restrictions rule out the cases corresponding to the
shaded cells with reference “x.”
Second, we can rule out a series of remaining cases in which the strategy pro-
file is not responsive. These are the cells in dark gray.
Third, from the characterization of the information-aggregation equilibrium,
we have that (i) if agents vQ play v with probability one, then agents vR can be piv-
otal only if all agents receive a signal vR, in which case they strictly prefer to play r.
We can therefore rule out another set of profiles. The corresponding cells are
shaded and labeled “Prop 6.”
Fourth, from equation (A5), it is easy to show that, if agents vQ play qv or qrv,
then vR -agents play r with probability one only if fQ ≤ f2. But then, we have that
GðvjvQ Þ < 0, a contradiction. We can therefore rule out these profiles as well.
The corresponding cells are shaded and labeled “no veto.”
Finally, the remaining cells correspond to the two equilibria we have character-
ized.Andwehave shown that they arebothuniquewithin their strategyprofileclass.Appendix B
Equilibrium Analysis under Unanimity
In this appendix, we characterize the unique responsive equilibrium under Una-
nimity. Doing so, we extend the equilibrium characterization in Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1998) to biased information structure and the possible presence of
a private-value agent.
As under Veto, vP -agents strictly prefer to play v, that is, jUv ðvP Þ 5 1, in any re-
sponsive symmetric equilibrium under Unanimity. It is therefore straightforward
to extend proposition 1.
Proposition 8. Under Unanimity, for any vector p, j* is an equilibrium un-
der Unanimity if and only if
i. private-value agents veto the reform,
ii. j* is an equilibrium of the corresponding game with p 5 0.FIG. A2.—All possible classes of (symmetric) strategy profiles. For instance, strategy rq
for agents of type zmeans that they play r and q (but not v) with strictly positive probability.This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on September 04, 2018 07:40:19 AM
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majority rules with veto power 137Proof. Identical to that of proposition 1.
As for Veto, this proposition greatly simplifies the equilibrium analysis by al-
lowing us to focus on the pure common-value game in which p 5 0. This is ex-
actly what we do in the remainder of this appendix.Pivot Probabilities and Expected Payoffs
Under Unanimity, a vote for r is pivotal if and only if, without that vote, the group
decision isQ but, with that vote, it becomes R. This happens when no other agent
is casting a v -vote (i.e., xv 5 0). In this case, we say that the vote is pivotal in favor
of R. We denote this event in state q by pivq,UR . The probability of that event de-
pends on expected vote shares, which in turn depend on the state of the world
and agent strategies. We denote Prðpivq,UR Þ the probability of being pivotal in fa-
vor of R in state q under Unanimity. Formally,
Pr pivq,URð Þ 5 tqrð Þn21: (B1)
A vote for v cannot be pivotal. Indeed, there is no combination of other
agents’ vote such that the decision is R without this vote and becomes Q with
it. In fact, either xv > 0 and the “current” outcome, Q , can no longer be changed
or xv 5 0, which implies xr 5 n 2 1 < n, and the “current” outcome is Q. Re-
member that q is not an available action under U.
The expected payoff of actions r for an agent of type v ∈ fvR , vQg under Una-
nimity is
GU ðr jvÞ 5 PrðqR jvÞ Pr pivqR ,URð Þ 2 PrðqQ jvÞ Pr pivqQ ,UR
 
, (B2)
and the expected payoff of actions v for an agent with signal v ∈ fvR , vQg under
Unanimity is
GU ðvjvÞ 5 0: (B3)
The Unique Equilibrium
The following proposition extends the equilibrium characterization in Fedder-
sen and Pesendorfer (1998) to possibly biased information structures and the
possible presence of private-value agents.
Proposition 9. The following strategy profile is the unique responsive sym-
metric equilibrium under Unanimity:
i. If fQ < f4, then
j*
U
r vRð Þ 5 1,
j*
U
r ðvQ Þ 5 a*,
j*
U
v ðvQ Þ 5 1 2 a*,This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on September 04, 2018 07:40:19 AM
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a* 5
ðfQ 2 1Þ fR 2 ðfQ Þ1=ðn21Þ
 
fR 2 1ð Þ ðfQ Þ1=ðn21ÞfQ 2 1
  ∈ ð0, 1Þ:
ii. If fQ ≥ f4, then
j*
U
r vRð Þ 5 1 and j*Uv ðvQ Þ 5 1:
Proof. See the online appendix.
The intuition is easier to grasp by first explaining why and when vR -agents vot-
ing r and vQ -agents voting v is not an equilibrium (i.e., fQ < f4). Consider an
agent who receives signal vQ. She believes, but is not sure, that Q is a better deci-
sion than R. When deciding which vote to cast, she focuses only on situations in
which her vote is pivotal. Under Unanimity, this happens only when all other
agents vote for r (event pivq,UR ). If vR -agents vote r and vQ -agents vote v, this hap-
pens if all other agents have received a signal vR, which is more likely to happen
in state qR than in state qQ. As long as the precision of the vQ signal is not too high
(i.e., fQ < f4), the joint event (n 2 1 vR -signals and one vQ -signal) is also more
likely in state qR than in state qQ. She is thus better overlooking her signal and
voting for r. Therefore, vR -agents voting r and vQ -agents voting v cannot be an
equilibrium in this case.
To understand why the equilibrium is in mixed strategies when fQ < f4, notice
that when vQ -agents mix between r and v, the information content conditional
on being pivotal decreases (since vQ -agents also vote r with positive probability,
the fact of being pivotal no longer hinges on all other agents having received
vR -signals; hence, the posterior probability of being in state qR when being pivotal
decreases). For jUr ðvQ Þ large enough, this information content is too low to con-
vince vQ -agents to overlook their signal. The equilibrium corresponds to the case
in which the posterior probability of being in either state is equal, which makes
agents indifferent between the two actions.
For fQ ≥ f4, the precision of the vQ -signal is so high that a vQ -agent remains
convinced that state qQ is more likely when all other agents received a vR-signal.
In other words, a single vQ -signal would suffice to convince an agent that could
observe the n signals and could decide for the group to choose decision Q.
Therefore, vR -agents voting r and vQ -agents voting v is an equilibrium. Note that
there always is an n sufficiently large that this case does not arise.
Appendix C
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Given proposition 1, we can focus on p 5 0.
First, note that v is a weakly dominant strategy for vQ -agents when fQ > ðfRÞn21.
The proof that vR -agents play r under k -Veto is similar to step v of the proof of
proposition 6 (the proposition is in app. A and the proof in the online appen-
dix).This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on September 04, 2018 07:40:19 AM
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majority rules with veto power 139Second, we prove that, for each tuple ðfQ , fR , n, pÞ, vR -agents playing r and
vQ -agents playing q is an equilibrium if
fQ ∈ fRð Þðk21Þ=ðn112kÞ, fRð Þk=ðn2kÞ
 
:
To do so, we first need to define the gains to vote r or v for each common-value
agent type under k -Veto when vR -agents play r and vQ -agents play q :
Gkðr jvRÞ ; fR
fR 1 1
n 2 1
n 2 1
2
0
@
1
A½Pr vR jqRð Þk21½PrðvQ jqRÞn2k
2
1
fR 1 1
n 2 1
n 2 1
2
0
@
1
A½Pr½vR jqQ Þk21½PrðvQ jqQ Þn2k ,
Gkðr jvQ Þ ; 1
fQ 1 1
n 2 1
n 2 1
2
0
@
1
A½Pr vR jqRð Þk21½PrðvQ jqRÞn2k
2
fQ
fQ 1 1
n 2 1
n 2 1
2
0
@
1
A½PrðvR jqQ Þk21½PrðvQ jqQ Þn2k ,
GkðvjvRÞ ; 1
fR 1 1o
n21
j5k
n 2 1
j
 !
½PrðvR jqQ Þj ½PrðvQ jqQ Þn212j
2
fR
fR 1 1o
n21
j5k
n 2 1
j
 !
½Pr vR jqRð Þj ½PrðvQ jqRÞn212j ,
GkðvjvQ Þ ; fQ
fQ 1 1o
n21
j5k
n 2 1
j
 !
½PrðvR jqQ Þj ½PrðvQ jqRÞn212j
2
1
fQ 1 1o
n21
j5k
n 2 1
j
 !
½Pr vR jqRð Þj ½PrðvQ jqRÞn212j :
For jr ðvRÞ 5 1 and jqðvQ Þ 5 1 to be an equilibrium, we need (a) Gkðr jvRÞ ≥ 0,
(b) Gkðr jvQ Þ ≤ 0, (c) GkðvjvQ Þ ≤ 0, and (d) Gkðr jvRÞ ≥ GkðvjvRÞ. From GkðvjvQ Þ ≥
GkðvjvRÞ and conditions a and c, we have that d is necessarily satisfied. It remains
to prove that conditions a, b, and c are satisfied.
Consider condition a. In this case, Gkðr jvRÞ ≥ 0 boils down to
fR ≥
1
fR
 k21
fQ
 n2k
,
which is satisfied iff fQ ≤ ðfRÞk=ðn2kÞ, which holds by assumption.This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on September 04, 2018 07:40:19 AM
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AllConsider condition c. In this case, Gkðr jvQ Þ ≤ 0 boils down to
1
fQ
≤
1
fR
 k21
fQ
 n2k
,
which is satisfied iff ðfRÞðk21Þ=ðn112kÞ ≤ fQ , which holds by assumption.
Consider condition d. Following an approach identical to that in the proof of
proposition 6 (for the equivalent condition), we obtain a term-by-term sufficient
condition for GkðvjvQ Þ ≤ 0:
fQ ≤ fRð Þj=ðn2jÞ:
From fQ ≤ ðfRÞk=ðn2kÞ, fR > 1, and
j
n 2 j
≥
k
n 2 k
8 j ∈ fk, ::: , n 2 1g,
we have that this is satisfied. QEDProof of Theorem 1
To prove the theorem, we show that all agents are weakly better off under Veto at
the information-aggregation equilibrium (we denote the corresponding mecha-
nism by VjIA) than at the unique equilibrium under Unanimity (UjU ) and that,
unless vi 5 vP or fQ ≥ f4, some agents are strictly better off.
First, VjIAðvÞ 5 UjU ðvÞ 5 Q when there exists i such that vi 5 vP or fQ ≥ f4. In
these cases, all agents are equally well off ex post and, therefore, at the interim
stage.
Now consider vi ≠ vP for all i and fQ < f4. The game is equivalent to the pure
common-value game (i.e., p 5 0). We show that
ui VjIA vij Þ > ui UjUð jvið Þ (C1)
holds for all fR, fQ, and n and for all possible realizations of v, at least weakly for
vQ -agents, and strictly for vR -agents.
Step 1: vQ -agents. Under Unanimity, the strategy of a vQ -agent is jUr ðvQ Þ 5 a*
and jUv ðvQ Þ 5 1 2 a* (proposition 9 in app. B). As she is indifferent between
playing r and v, her interim utility is the same in both cases. If she plays v, then
the decision is Q for sure, and her expected utility is minus the probability to be
in state qR conditional on being type vQ, that is,
uiðUjU jvQ Þ 5 21
1 1 fQ
:
Under Veto, at the information-aggregation equilibrium (proposition 6 in
app. A), vQ -agents either choose not to veto or are indifferent between vetoing
and voting q. They cannot be strictly worse off under VjIA than UjU by a simple re-
vealed preference argument: these agents could always ensure a level of expected
utility equal to 21=ð1 1 fQ Þ by vetoing. Note that we can in fact show that they
are strictly better off under VjIA than UjU when they choose not to (but this is not
needed for theorem 1).This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on September 04, 2018 07:40:19 AM
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majority rules with veto power 141Step 2: vR -agents when fQ ∈ ½f1, f2. In this case, under both mechanisms,
vR -agents always play r. Their interim utility is (for any fQ)
uiðUjU jvRÞ 5 2fR
1 1 fR
1
fR Pr xr 5 n 2 1 qR , jUj Þ 2 Pr xr 5 n 2 1ð jqQ , jU
 
1 1 fR
, (C2)
uiðVjIA jvRÞ 5 2fR
1 1 fR
1
fR Pr xr ≥
n 2 1
2
 qR , jIA
 
2 Pr xr ≥
n 2 1
2
 qQ , jIA
 
1 1 fR
:
(C3)
For condition (C1) to hold strictly, we need
fR Pr xr ≥
n 2 1
2
 qR , jIA
 
2 Pr xr ≥
n 2 1
2
 qQ , jIA
 
> fR Pr xr 5 n 2 1
 qR , jU	 
 2 Pr xr 5 n 2 1  qQ , jU	 
:
From propositions 6 and 9, this becomes
o
n21
j5ðn21Þ=2
n 2 1
j
 !
fRðfRðfQ 2 1ÞÞj fR 2 1ð Þn212j2ðfQ 2 1Þj ½fQ ðfR 2 1Þn212j
ðfQfR 2 1Þn21
>
fRðfRðfQ 2 1Þ 1 ðfR 2 1Þa*Þn21 2 ½ðfQ 2 1Þ 1 fQ ðfR 2 1Þa*n21
ðfQfR 2 1Þn21
:
We can then rewrite the left-hand side as
fR 2 1ð Þn21
ðfQfR 2 1Þn21 o
n21
j5ðn21Þ=2
n 2 1
j
 !
fQ 2 1
fR 2 1
 j
½ fRð Þj112ðfQ Þn212j :
We can also distribute the right-hand side and group it similarly to the left-hand
side:
fR 2 1ð Þn21
ðfQfR 2 1Þn21 o
n21
0
n 2 1
j
 !
fQ 2 1
fR 2 1
 j
ða*Þn212j fRð Þj112ðfQ Þn212j
 
:
We therefore need to show
o
n21
j5ðn21Þ=2
n 2 1
j
 !
fQ 2 1
fR 2 1
 j
fRð Þj112ðfQ Þn212j
 
> o
n21
0
n 2 1
j
 !
fQ 2 1
fR 2 1
 j
ða*Þn212j fRð Þj112ðfQ Þn212j
 
:
(C4)
We can now compare these two sums term by term (recall that here fQ ∈
½f1, f2) and show that the left-hand-side terms are always larger that the right-
hand-side terms. First, observe that the terms in j 5 n 2 1 cancel out. Second,
for j ∈ ½ðn 2 1Þ=2, n 2 1Þ, note that from fQ ≤ f2 ; ðfRÞðn11Þ=ðn21Þ, we have that
ðfRÞj11 ≥ ðfQ Þn212j , with strict inequality for j > ðn 2 1Þ=2. Since a* < 1, the left-This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on September 04, 2018 07:40:19 AM
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Allhand-side terms are strictly higher than the right-hand-side terms for all j ∈
½ðn21Þ=2, n21Þ. Third, for j < ðn21Þ=2, note that from fQ ≥f1 ; ðfRÞðn21Þ=ðn11Þ,
we have that ðfRÞj11 ≤ ðfQ Þn212j , with strict inequality for j < ðn 2 3Þ=2. So all
the respective terms on the right-hand side are negative and are equal to zero
in the left-hand side.
Step 3: vR -agents when fQ ∈ ðf2, f3. In this case, under UjU , vR -agents still al-
ways play r. Hence, their interim utility is still given by (C2). But we have
jIAr ðvRÞ 5 1 2 ε* and jIAq ðvRÞ 5 ε* (proposition 6). Since they mix, their interim
utility is the same in both cases:
uiðVj IA jvRÞ 5 2fR
1 1 fR
1
fR Pr xr ≥
n 1 1
2
 qR , jIA
 
2 Pr xr ≥
n 1 1
2
 qQ , jIA
 
1 1 fR
:
This can be rewritten as follows:
uiðVjIA jvRÞ 5 ðfRfQ 2 1Þ1=ðn21Þ o
n21
j5ðn11Þ=2
n 2 1
j
 !
ð1 2 ε*ÞjðfQ 2 1Þj
 f fRð Þj11½ε*fRðfQ 2 1Þ 1 ðfR 2 1Þn212j
2 ½ε*ðfQ 2 1Þ 1 fQ ðfR 2 1Þn212jg:
By the definition of ε*, it is easy to show that the term in j 5 ðn 2 1Þ=2 is nil (it
exactly corresponds to the agent’s gain of playing r, which is nil in this equilib-
rium) and that the terms in j < ðn 2 1Þ=2 are strictly negative. Therefore, we
have that
uiðVjIA jvRÞ > ðfRfQ 2 1Þ1=ðn21Þo
n21
j50
n 2 1
j
 !
ð1 2 ε*ÞjðfQ 2 1Þj
 f fRð Þj11½ε*fRðfQ 2 1Þ 1 ðfR 2 1Þn212j
2 ½ε*ðfQ 2 1Þ 1 fQ ðfR 2 1Þn212jg:
Using the binomial theorem, this corresponds to
uiðVjIA jvRÞ > ðfRfQ 2 1Þ1=ðn21ÞffR ½fRðfQ 2 1Þ 1 ðfR 2 1Þn21
2 ½ðfQ 2 1Þ 1 fQ ðfR 2 1Þn21g:
Now, from proposition 9, we have
uiðUjU jvRÞ 5 ðfRfQ 2 1Þ1=ðn21ÞffR ½fRfQ 2 1Þ 1 ðfR 2 1Þa*n21
2 ½ðfQ 2 1Þ 1 fQ ðfR 2 1Þa*n21g:
Thus, for uiðVjIA jvRÞ > uiðUjU jvRÞ to hold, it is sufficient that
fR ½fRðfQ 2 1Þ 1 ðfR 2 1Þn21 2 ½ðfQ 2 1Þ 1 fQ ðfR 2 1Þn21
≥ fR ½fRðfQ 2 1Þ 1 ðfR 2 1Þa*n21 2 ½ðfQ 2 1Þ 1 fQ ðfR 2 1Þa*n21:
To prove that this is always satisfied, we show that the derivative of the right-hand
side with respect to a* is positive:This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on September 04, 2018 07:40:19 AM
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ðn 2 1ÞðfR 2 1ÞffR ½fRðfQ 2 1Þ 1 ðfR 2 1Þa*n22
2 fQ ½ðfQ 2 1Þ 1 fQ ðfR 2 1Þa*n22g > 0:
To see this, we use that GU ðvjvQ Þ 5 0 in equilibrium requires (see the proof of
proposition 6 in the online appendix)
fRðfQ 2 1Þ 1 ðfR 2 1Þa* 5 f1=ðn21ÞQ ½ðfQ 2 1Þ 1 fQ ðfR 2 1Þa*:
Then this condition boils down to
fRf
21=ðn21Þ
Q > 1,
which is always strictly satisfied when fQ < f4.
Step 4: vR -agents when fQ ∈ ðf3, f4Þ. To show that VjIA ex ante strictly domi-
nates UjU , we construct a (nonequilibrium) strategy profile j
0 such that Vj0 ex
ante dominates VjU . That is,
ui Vj0ð Þ > ui VjUð Þ:
By McLennan (1998), which shows that the strategy that maximizes ex ante wel-
fare in a common-value game must be an equilibrium, we know that there must
be another equilibrium under Veto that ex ante strictly dominates jU. Since there
are only two equilibria under Veto, this dominating equilibrium must be jIA.
Since VjU is equivalent to UjU , that is, VjU ðvÞ 5 UjU ðvÞ for all v, we have that
ui VjIAð Þ > ui UjUð Þ:
Define j 0 as follows:
j0r ðvRÞ 5 1, j0qðvRÞ 5 a*, j0vðvRÞ 5 1 2 a*,
where a* corresponds to that of proposition 7.
The vR -agents are strictly better off if
o
n21
j5ðn21Þ=2
n 2 1
j
 !
fR ðfRðfQ 2 1ÞÞj ½a*ðfR 2 1Þn212j 2 ðfQ 2 1Þj ½a*fQ ðfR 2 1Þn212j
ðfQfR 2 1Þn21
>
fRðfRðfQ 2 1Þ 1 ðfR 2 1Þa*Þn21 2 ½ðfQ 2 1Þ 1 fQ ðfR 2 1Þa*n21
ðfQfR 2 1Þn21
:
We can then rewrite the left-hand side as
fR 2 1ð Þn21
ðfQfR 2 1Þn21 o
n21
j5ðn21Þ=2
n 2 1
j
 !
fQ 2 1
fR 2 1
 j
ða*Þn212j ½ fRð Þj112ðfQ Þn212j :
We can also distribute the right-hand side and group it similarly to the left-hand
side:
fR 2 1ð Þn21
ðfQfR 2 1Þn21 o
n21
0
n 2 1
j
 !
fQ 2 1
fR 2 1
 j
ða*Þn212j ½ fRð Þj112ðfQ Þn212j :
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AllAnd it is obvious that the condition holds strictly since we have that ðfRÞj11 ≤
ðfQ Þn212j for all j ≤ ðn 2 3Þ=2 since fQ ≥ f3 ; ðfRÞðn11Þ=ðn21Þ (see the proof for
proposition 6).
The vQ -agents are better off if
o
n21
j5ðn21Þ=2
n 2 1
j
 !
½fRðfQ 2 1Þj ½a*ðfR 2 1Þn212j 2 fQ ðfQ 2 1Þj ½a*fQ ðfR 2 1Þn212j
ðfQfR 2 1Þn21
≥
½fRðfQ 2 1Þ 1 ðfR 2 1Þa*n21 2 fQ ððfQ 2 1Þ 1 fQ ðfR 2 1Þa*Þn21
ðfQfR 2 1Þn21
:
We can then rewrite the left-hand side as
fR 2 1ð Þn21
ðfQfR 2 1Þn21 o
n21
j5ðn11Þ=2
n 2 1
j
 !
fQ 2 1
fR 2 1
 j
ða*Þn212j ½ fRð Þj2ðfQ Þn2j :
We can also distribute the right-hand side and group it similarly to the left-hand
side:
fR 2 1ð Þn21
ðfQfR 2 1Þn21 o
n21
0
n 2 1
j
 !
fQ 2 1
fR 2 1
 j
ða*Þn212j ½ fRð Þj2ðfQ Þn2j :
And it is obvious that the condition holds since we have that ðfRÞj ≤ ðfQ Þn2j for
all j ≤ ðn 2 1Þ=2 since fQ ≥ f3 ; ðfRÞðn11Þ=ðn21Þ. Hence, uiðVj0 Þ > uiðVjU Þ, which is
what we need.
Step 5: vR -agents when fQ ∈ ð1, f1Þ. First we use h* and a* (from proposi-
tions 6 and 9) to derive the probabilities that the reform is adopted (conditional
on the agent being vR) in each state under both rules (remember that jAIr ðvRÞ 5
1 5 jUr ðvRÞ in the case under consideration):
QV qRð Þ ; PrðVjAI ðvÞ 5 R jqR Þ 5 Pr xr ≥ n 2 1
2
 and  xv 5 0
 qR , jIA
 
5
1
½ðfQ Þ2n=ðn21Þ 2 1n21 o
n21
j5ðn21Þ=2
n 2 1
j
 !
fQ
 jðn11Þ=ðn21ÞfðfQ 2 1Þj ½ðfQ Þðn11Þ=ðn21Þ 2 1n212jg,
QV ðqQ Þ ; PrðVjAI ðvÞ 5 R jqQ Þ 5 Pr xr ≥ n 2 1
2
 and  xv 5 0
 qQ , jIA
 
5
1
½ðfQ Þ2n=ðn21Þ 2 1n21 o
n21
j5ðn21Þ=2
n 2 1
j
 !
ðfQ Þn212jfðfQ 2 1Þj ½ðfQ Þðn11Þ=ðn21Þ 2 1n212jg,
QU qRð Þ ; PrðUjU ðvÞ 5 R jqR Þ 5 Prðxr 5 n 2 1jqR , jU Þ 5 fQ ðfQ 2 1Þ
n21
½ðfQ Þn=ðn21Þ 2 1n21
,  
QU ðqQ Þ ; PrðUjU ðvÞ 5 R jqQ Þ 5 Prðxr 5 n 2 1jqQ , jU Þ 5 ðfQ 2 1Þ
n21
½ðfQ Þn=ðn21Þ 2 1n21
:
Note that they are all independent from fR.
The interim utility of a vR -agent is given by (C2) and (C3) under UjU and VjIA ,
respectively. Therefore, uiðVjIA jvRÞ 2 uiðUjU jvRÞ is given byThis content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on September 04, 2018 07:40:19 AM
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V qRð Þ 2 QV ðqQ Þ
1 1 fR
2
fRQ
U qRð Þ 2 QU ðqQ Þ
1 1 fR
:
From step 2, we know that uiðVjIA jvRÞ > uiðUjU jvRÞ when fQ 5 f1. To prove that
this inequality holds for any fQ ∈ ð1, fRÞ, it is sufficient to prove that it is satisfied
for any fR larger than the fR such that fQ 5 f1. Given that QW (q) is independent
of fR for all W and q, a sufficient condition for uiðVjIA jvRÞ > uiðUjU jvRÞ to be satis-
fied for larger fR is that Q
V ðqRÞ ≥ QU ðqRÞ. Thus, we need to prove that the follow-
ing inequality is satisfied when fQ ∈ ð1, f1Þ:
o
n21
j5ðn21Þ=2
n 2 1
j
 !
½ðfQ 2 1Þfðn11Þ=ðn21ÞQ j ½fðn11Þ=ðn21ÞQ 2 1n212j
½f2n=ðn21ÞQ 2 1n21
> fQ
ðfQ 2 1Þn21
½ðfQ Þn=ðn21Þ 2 1n21
:
This boils down to
o
n21
j5ðn21Þ=2
n 2 1
j
 !
½ðfQ 2 1Þfðn11Þ=ðn21ÞQ j ½fðn11Þ=ðn21ÞQ 2 1n212j
> fQ ððfQ Þn=ðn21Þ 1 1Þn21ðfQ 2 1Þn21:
Using lemma 4 (see below), we can substitute for fðn11Þ=ðn21ÞQ 2 1 and cancel the
terms in ðfQ 2 1Þn21. This gives
o
n21
j5ðn21Þ=2
n 2 1
j
 !
f
jðn11Þ=ðn21Þ
Q
n 1 1
n 2 1
f
1=ðn21Þ
Q
 n212j
> fQ ððfQ Þn=ðn21Þ 1 1Þn21:
Using the binomial theorem, we have
o
n21
j5ðn21Þ=2
n 2 1
j
 !
f
j½n=ðn21Þ
Q
n 1 1
n 2 1
 n212j
> o
n21
k50
n 2 1
k
 !
ðfQ Þk½n=ðn21Þ:
Given that the terms in j 5 n 2 1 5 k cancel out, we can focus on j < n 2 1 and
k < n 2 1. Note that, for all j < n 2 1,
n 1 1
n 2 1
 n212j
5 1 1
2
n 2 1
 n212j
5 1 1
2 n 2 1 2 jð Þ
n 2 1
n 2 1 2 j
2
64
3
75
n212j
≥ 1 1
n 2 1 2 j
n 2 1
2
(indeed, for x ≥ 21 and r ∈ Rnð0, 1Þ, we know that ð1 1 xÞr ≥ 1 1 rx is satisfied).
Thus, it is sufficient to show that
o
n22
j5ðn21Þ=2
n 2 1
j
 !
f
j ½n=ðn21Þ
Q 1 1
n 2 1 2 j
n 2 1
2
0
B@
1
CA > on22
k50
n 2 1
k
 !
ðfQ Þk½n=ðn21Þ,
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n22
j5ðn21Þ=2
n 2 1ð Þ !
n 2 1 2 jð Þ ! j !
n 2 1 2 j
n 2 1
2
0
B@
1
CAðfQ Þj ½n=ðn21Þ
> o
ðn23Þ=2
k50
n 2 1ð Þ !
n 2 1 2 kð Þ ! k ! ðfQ Þ
k½n=ðn21Þ:
Let us compare the terms two-by-two in the following order: j 5 ðn 2 1Þ=2
with k 5 ðn 2 3Þ=2, j 5 ðn 1 1Þ=2 with k 5 ðn 2 5Þ=2, j 5 ðn 1 3Þ=2 with k 5
ðn 2 7Þ=2, ::: , and j 5 n 2 2 with k 5 0. This comparison boils down to
n 2 1 2 j
n21
2
n 2 1ð Þ !
n 2 1 2 jð Þ ! j ! ≥
n 2 1ð Þ !
j 1 1ð Þ ! n 2 1 2 j 2 1ð Þ ! :
Simple algebra gives j ≥ ½ðn 2 1Þ=2 2 1, which is satisfied since we consider all
j ∈
n 2 1
2
,
n 1 1
2
, ::: , n 2 2
 
:
QED
Lemma 4. For all x ≥ 1, n > 1, we have that
xðn11Þ=ðn21Þ 2 1 ≥
n 1 1
n 2 1
xn=ðn21Þ 2 x1=ðn21Þ
 
:
Proof. See the online appendix.References
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